Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2017.09.001MaRDI QIDQ1680147zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Battal Doğan

Publication date 22 November 2017

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.09.001

zbMATH Keywords

implementationNash equilibriumresponsible agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A crash course in implementation theory
• A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
• Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
• Divide-and-permute
• Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
• Handbook of game theory with economic applications. Vol. 3
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies
• Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
• Picking the winners
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
• The scholarship assignment problem
• The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules

Cited in

(10)

• Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
• Motives and implementation with rights structures
• Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
• Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
• Implementation with a sympathizer
• Optimal allocation without transfer payments
• On voluntary and efficient allocations
• Evaluation and strategic manipulation
• Optimal welfare strategies vs Nash equilibrium strategies in a game with homogeneous players
• Honesty and epistemological implementation of social choice functions with asymmetric information

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