Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2017.09.001zbMATH Open1415.91177OpenAlexW2595079790MaRDI QIDQ1680147FDOQ1680147

Authors: Battal Doğan 

Publication date: 22 November 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.09.001

Recommendations

• Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
• Optimal allocation without transfer payments
• Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• Optimal allocation of an indivisible good

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumimplementationresponsible agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Handbook of game theory with economic applications. Vol. 3
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• A crash course in implementation theory
• The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
• Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
• Picking the winners
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• The scholarship assignment problem
• Divide-and-permute
• Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
• Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies
• Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies

Cited In (8)

• Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
• Motives and implementation with rights structures
• On voluntary and efficient allocations
• Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
• Implementation with a sympathizer
• Evaluation and strategic manipulation
• Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
• Optimal allocation without transfer payments

This page was built for publication: Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1680147)