The scholarship assignment problem
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Publication:700089
DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0852zbMATH Open1023.91001OpenAlexW2146393798MaRDI QIDQ700089FDOQ700089
Authors: Pablo Amorós, Bernardo Moreno, Luis Corchón 
Publication date: 30 September 2002
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3934
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Cites Work
- Consistent Bayesian aggregation
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- A Bayesian model of voting in juries
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
Cited In (16)
- Microthesis: The student-project allocation problem
- Implementation theory
- Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction
- Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties
- An incentive dynamic programming method for the optimization of scholarship assignment
- Selecting winners with partially honest jurors
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
- Picking the winners
- A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
- A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
- Symmetry and impartial lotteries
- Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
- Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
- Evaluation and strategic manipulation
- Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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