Recommendations
- Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
- Selecting winners with partially honest jurors
- A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
- A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
Cites work
- A Bayesian model of voting in juries
- A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- Aggregation of expert opinions
- Convergence results for unanimous voting
- Eliciting information from multiple experts
- Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
- The scholarship assignment problem
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
Cited in
(15)- Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition
- An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave
- Sensitivity analyses and measurements for group decisions using weighted scoring rules
- Selecting winners with partially honest jurors
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
- A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
- A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
- Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
- On incentive compatible competitive selection protocols
- Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
- Implementation with a sympathizer
- Evaluation and strategic manipulation
- Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
- Nash implementation of supermajority rules
- Winning a Pool Is Harder Than You Thought
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