A Bayesian model of voting in juries
From MaRDI portal
Publication:700076
DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0843zbMATH Open1006.91028OpenAlexW2039063610MaRDI QIDQ700076FDOQ700076
Authors: John Duggan, César Martinelli 
Publication date: 30 September 2002
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/1038
Recommendations
- A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood
- On the Fairness of Death-Penalty Jurors: A Comparison of Bayesian Models with Different Levels of Hierarchy and Various Missing-Data Mechanisms
- A theory of hung juries and informative voting
- Jury voting without objective probability
- On probability models in voting theory
Cites Work
Cited In (48)
- Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition
- Pretrial beliefs and verdict accuracy: costly juror effort and free riding
- The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences
- Jury voting without objective probability
- Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition
- Feddersen and Pesendorfer meet Ellsberg
- Voting to persuade
- First and second best voting rules in committees
- Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives
- Voting in small committees
- Plea bargaining: on the selection of jury trials
- Pandering and electoral competition
- Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting
- A theory of hung juries and informative voting
- Judgment aggregation in search for the truth
- Optimal delay in committees
- Comparative reliability of verdicts
- Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments
- Voting with public information
- Conservativeness in jury decision-making
- A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood
- Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?
- A model of jury decisions where all jurors have the same evidence
- Inquiry and deliberation in judicial systems: the problem of jury size
- Picking the winners
- Jury theorems with multiple alternatives
- Deliberative voting
- The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition
- The scholarship assignment problem
- Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types
- Subgroup deliberation and voting
- Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
- Consistent representative democracy
- An invariance result for homogeneous juries with correlated votes
- On the Significance of the Absolute Margin
- Evaluation and strategic manipulation
- Would rational voters acquire costly information?
- Jury size and jury verdicts
- Voting on tricky questions
- Full information equivalence in large elections
- Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting
- Optimizing voting order on sequential juries: a median voter theorem and beyond
- Information structures and information aggregation in threshold equilibria in elections
- The importance of voting order for jury decisions by sequential majority voting
- Convergence results for unanimous voting
- Information aggregation with a continuum of types
- Extending the Condorcet jury theorem to a general dependent jury
- Unanimous rules in the laboratory
This page was built for publication: A Bayesian model of voting in juries
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q700076)
