A Bayesian model of voting in juries
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Publication:700076
DOI10.1006/game.2001.0843zbMath1006.91028OpenAlexW2039063610MaRDI QIDQ700076
Publication date: 30 September 2002
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/1038
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