Voting on tricky questions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.01.008zbMATH Open1483.91071OpenAlexW4206980361MaRDI QIDQ2078087FDOQ2078087

Authors: Tomoya Tajika 

Publication date: 25 February 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.008

Recommendations

• Voting with Limited Information and Many Alternatives
• Voting with limited information and many alternatives
• Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types
• Voting with public information
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information

zbMATH Keywords

inefficiencystrategic votinginformation aggregationprecision uncertainty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Evolution of smart\(_ n\) players
• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Deliberative voting
• Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives
• A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem
• Aggregating information by voting: the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses
• Preference monotonicity and information aggregation in elections
• Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility
• The fragility of information aggregation in large elections
• The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences
• Public protests and policy making
• Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: a `state of the art' model
• Condorcet meets Ellsberg
• Contribute once! Full efficiency in a dynamic contribution game
• Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting

Cited In (8)

• Voting with limited information and many alternatives
• Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments
• Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner
• Information efficiency and majority decisions
• Crowdvoting judgment: an analysis of modern peer review
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Non-congruent views about signal precision in collective decisions
• The fragility of information aggregation in large elections

This page was built for publication: Voting on tricky questions

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2078087)