Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: a `state of the art' model
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Publication:2013360
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.03.003zbMATH Open1393.91051OpenAlexW2605285875MaRDI QIDQ2013360FDOQ2013360
Justin Valasek, Tomas Rodriguez-Barraquer, Rune Midjord
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.003
Cites Work
Cited In (6)
- A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees
- (A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting
- When voters like to be right : an analysis of the Condorcet jury theorem with mixed motives
- Voting on tricky questions
- Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: a `state of the art' model
- Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees
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