Stability and voting by committees with exit

DOI10.1007/S00355-003-0246-6zbMATH Open1090.91017OpenAlexW2172239408MaRDI QIDQ1762858FDOQ1762858

Authors: Dolors Berga, G. Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme 

Publication date: 11 February 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10256/15137

Recommendations

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cited In (17)

• Unanimity and resource monotonicity
• Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains
• On stable rules for selecting committees
• On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency
• On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
• A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
• Core-stable committees under restricted domains
• An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
• On exiting after voting
• Power set extensions of dichotomous preferences
• Simple collective identity functions
• Voting for voters: the unanimity case
• The stability of decision making in committees: the one-core
• Democratic forking: choosing sides with social choice
• Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: a `state of the art' model
• Procedural group identification
• Candidate stability and voting correspondences

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