Stability and voting by committees with exit
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Publication:1762858
DOI10.1007/S00355-003-0246-6zbMATH Open1090.91017OpenAlexW2172239408MaRDI QIDQ1762858FDOQ1762858
Authors: Dolors Berga, G. Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme
Publication date: 11 February 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10256/15137
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- A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
- Core-stable committees under restricted domains
- An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
- On exiting after voting
- Power set extensions of dichotomous preferences
- Simple collective identity functions
- Voting for voters: the unanimity case
- The stability of decision making in committees: the one-core
- Democratic forking: choosing sides with social choice
- Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: a `state of the art' model
- Procedural group identification
- Candidate stability and voting correspondences
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