Voting by committees under constraints
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Publication:2485953
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.006zbMath1112.91017OpenAlexW2138689146MaRDI QIDQ2485953
Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme, Salvador Barberá
Publication date: 5 August 2005
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/1328.pdf
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Cites Work
- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Voting under constraints
- Dictatorial domains
- An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
- Voting by Committees
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
