Voting by committees under constraints
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Publication:2485953
Recommendations
Cites work
- An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
- Dictatorial domains
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
- Voting by Committees
- Voting under constraints
Cited in
(43)- Committees, sequential voting and transparency
- The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
- Consensus rules for committee elections
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Revealed votes
- Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- Stability and voting by committees with exit
- Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
- Partially efficient voting by committees
- Strategy-proof choice with monotonic additive preferences
- Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: a `state of the art' model
- Random dictatorship domains
- Salvador Barberà
- Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
- On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
- A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
- Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains
- Manipulability of consular election rules
- Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
- Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
- A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings
- Democratic forking: choosing sides with social choice
- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
- Voting for Committees in Agreeable Societies
- Committee Selection with a Weight Constraint Based on a Pairwise Dominance Relation
- Voting by Committees
- Strategy-proof partitioning
- Controlling the order of moves in voting by veto. I: Conditions for making the given decision
- Committee selection under weight constraints
- Complexities of electing diverse committees
- Formation of committees through random voting rules
- Social Choice Theory
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
- Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains
- A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees
- Tops-only domains
- Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
- False-name-proof and strategy-proof voting rules under separable preferences
- On strategy-proofness and single peakedness: a full characterization
- The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
- Test me if you can -- providing optimal information for consumers through a novel certification mechanism
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