Random dictatorship domains

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.03.017zbMATH Open1296.91098OpenAlexW2141503757MaRDI QIDQ2016232FDOQ2016232

Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1400

Recommendations

• Dictatorial domains
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zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessrandom social choice functionsrandom dictatorship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Generalized median voter schemes and committees
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
• On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Tops-only domains
• Voting by Committees
• Circular domains
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Kelly's conjecture
• Voting by committees under constraints
• Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
• Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
• Decomposing random mechanisms
• Dictatorial domains
• An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
• Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
• The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
• Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
• Voting under constraints
• Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
• A geometric proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem

Cited In (21)

• Formation of Committees Through Random Voting Rules
• Decomposing random mechanisms
• A note on randomized social choice and random dictatorships
• A characterization of unanimity with status quo: fixed vs variable population
• On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
• Dictatorial domains
• On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
• Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains
• On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
• Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
• Unanimous and Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Single-Peaked Preference Profiles on Graphs
• Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes
• Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains
• Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
• Uniform random dictatorship: a characterization without strategy-proofness
• The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains
• Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system
• Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
• Stochastic same-sidedness in the random voting model
• On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
• An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains

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