Random dictatorship domains

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.03.017MaRDI QIDQ2016232zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng

Publication date 19 June 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1400

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessrandom social choice functionsrandom dictatorship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Dictatorial domains
• The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences
• A note on randomized social choice and random dictatorships
• Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation
• Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains

Cites work

• A geometric proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem
• An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
• Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
• Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
• Circular domains
• Decomposing random mechanisms
• Dictatorial domains
• Generalized median voter schemes and committees
• Kelly's conjecture
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
• Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
• Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
• Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
• Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
• Tops-only domains
• Voting by Committees
• Voting by committees under constraints
• Voting under constraints

Cited in

(24)

• Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes
• Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system
• Dictatorial domains
• The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences
• Uniform random dictatorship: a characterization without strategy-proofness
• Further results on dictatorial domains
• On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
• Circular domains
• A note on randomized social choice and random dictatorships
• The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains
• Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains
• Stochastic same-sidedness in the random voting model
• Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
• On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
• Formation of committees through random voting rules
• Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
• On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
• An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains
• Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
• Unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic rules for single-peaked preference profiles on graphs
• A characterization of unanimity with status quo: fixed vs variable population
• Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains
• On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
• Decomposing random mechanisms

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