Uniform random dictatorship: a characterization without strategy-proofness

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2023.111127MaRDI QIDQ6093638zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ali Ihsan Ozkes, M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date 12 September 2023

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ECONLET.2023.111127

zbMATH Keywords

independencerandom dictatorshipstrategy-proofnesstops-onlyness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A characterization of the plurality rule
• A theorem on aggregating classifications
• Aggregating sets of judgments: two impossibility results compared. With a comment by Isaac Levi
• An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
• An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions
• Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
• On the question ``who is a \(J\)?: a social choice approach
• Social choice and individual values
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Tops-only domains

Cited in

(2)

• A note on randomized social choice and random dictatorships
• Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information

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