A characterization of the plurality rule
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Recommendations
- A simple characterization of plurality rule
- An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
- A simple characterization of the anti-plurality rule
- A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity
- Characterizations of the plurality function
Cites work
- A characterization result for the plurality rule
- A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
- A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate
- A simple characterization of plurality rule
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
- Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
- Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Social Choice and Individual Ranking I
- Social Choice and Individual Rankings II
- Voting by Committees
Cited in
(16)- Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency
- A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity
- Axiomatic characterisations of the basic best-worst rule
- Uniform random dictatorship: a characterization without strategy-proofness
- Role of the plurality rule in multiple choices
- An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
- The greatest unhappiness of the least number
- Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities
- On two choice rules similar to the plurality rule and Borda’s rule
- The greatest unhappiness of the least number
- A simple characterization of the anti-plurality rule
- Characteristic properties of list proportional representation systems
- Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited
- The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization
- Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
- An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains
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