A simple characterization of plurality rule
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Publication:2564736
DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0119zbMath0868.90005OpenAlexW2035743689MaRDI QIDQ2564736
Publication date: 15 January 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0119
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