Robustness against inefficient manipulation

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0197-9MaRDI QIDQ2460084zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eyal Baharad, Zvika Neeman

Publication date 14 November 2007

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0197-9

zbMATH Keywords

coalitional manipulationCondorcet ruleexpected utilityscoring rulevoting rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Review text

This paper evaluates possibilities of coalitional manipulation leading to the choice of Pareto-dominated alternatives. Under assumptions such as common knowledge of agents preferences, rational behavior and complete preferences orderings by each agent, it shows that absence of ties in the individual orderings precludes inefficient manipulations. A classification of tie-breaking rules from the point of view of their potential vulnerability to inefficient manipulation is developed. The dimension of the space under which it may occur is also investigated.

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Cited in

(13)

• Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
• The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules
• Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
• Restricted manipulation in iterative voting: Condorcet efficiency and Borda score
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5501205 (Why is no real title available?)
• Multivalued decision rules and coalitional nonmanipulability. Two possibility theorems
• Can a Condorcet rule have a low coalitional manipulability
• Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems
• Statistical evaluation of voting rules
• Losses due to manipulation of social choice rules
• On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
• Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule
• Manipulation of the Pareto semi-optimal rule

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