Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
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Publication:1804641
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80005-3zbMATH Open0833.90012MaRDI QIDQ1804641FDOQ1804641
Authors: Andrew N. Ermolov 
Publication date: 15 May 1995
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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- Incentives in Teams
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism in Quasi-Linear Bargaining
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- The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus
- Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
Cited In (7)
- Social choice mechanism under complete information
- First results on applying a non-linear effect formalism to alliances between political parties and buy and sell dynamics
- Manipulations by coalitions under asymmetric information: The case of Groves mechanisms
- Approximate coalitional equilibria in the bipolar world
- The proportion of blocking coalitions in atomless economies
- Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information
- Coalitions under a competition mechanism of resource allocation
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