Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80005-3MaRDI QIDQ1804641zbMATHFDO

Authors Andrew N. Ermolov

Publication date 15 May 1995

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

egalitarian mechanismsocial choice mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule
• Coalitional manipulation on networks
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• Robustness against inefficient manipulation
• Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3709875 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
• Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism in Quasi-Linear Bargaining
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
• Incentives in Teams
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility

Cited in

(8)

• Coalitions under a competition mechanism of resource allocation
• Approximate coalitional equilibria in the bipolar world
• First results on applying a non-linear effect formalism to alliances between political parties and buy and sell dynamics
• Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information
• The proportion of blocking coalitions in atomless economies
• Coalitional manipulation on networks
• Social choice mechanism under complete information
• Manipulations by coalitions under asymmetric information: The case of Groves mechanisms

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