Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(82)90007-6zbMath0481.90005OpenAlexW1706773686MaRDI QIDQ1162429

Louis-André Gérard-Varet, Claude d'Aspremont

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90007-6

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian equilibriumgame with incomplete informationtruth-tellingmisrepresentation of preferencessufficient existence conditionsexistence of Pareto-efficient mechanismplayers with individual beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (20)

Mechanism design with information acquisition ⋮ Balanced Bayesian mechanisms ⋮ Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees ⋮ Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation ⋮ Putting Peer Prediction Under the Micro(economic)scope and Making Truth-Telling Focal ⋮ The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game. ⋮ Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values ⋮ Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations ⋮ Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability ⋮ On the values of Bayesian cooperative games with sidepayments ⋮ Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values ⋮ Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information ⋮ Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy ⋮ Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information ⋮ Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance ⋮ Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty: An overview ⋮ Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results ⋮ COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS ⋮ Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms ⋮ Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.

Cites Work

• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs