Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5954780
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(01)00059-3zbMath0996.91008WikidataQ127352666 ScholiaQ127352666MaRDI QIDQ5954780
Flavio M. Menezes, Paulo Klinger Monteiro, Akram Temimi
Publication date: 6 November 2002
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (7)
Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects ⋮ Private provision of discrete public goods: the correlated cost case ⋮ Complementarity and information in collective action ⋮ Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game ⋮ On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information ⋮ Optimal crowdfunding design ⋮ Auctioning a discrete public good under incomplete information
Cites Work
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
- Neutrality and the private provision of public goods with incomplete information
- Public subscription and private contributions
- Optimal selling procedures with fixed costs
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
- Optimal Auction Design
- Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Efficient Provision of a Discrete Public Good
- Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
- Joint Projects without Commitment
This page was built for publication: Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information
