Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information
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The private provision of discrete public goods is studied in situations of incomplete information and continuous contributions. Two scenarios are considered, one where contributions are not refunded if the project is not completed and the other where contributions are reunded. It is shown that in the former case, if cost is high enough, there are only strong free riding equilibria. Several equilibria of both types of situations are studied and a new proof ex-post inefficiency is given.
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Cites work
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Cited in
(20)- Neutrality and the private provision of public goods with incomplete information
- Voluntary public good provision with private information using order statistics
- Incomplete information and incentives to free ride
- Optimal crowdfunding design
- Auctioning a discrete public good under incomplete information
- Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects
- Private provision of discrete public goods: the correlated cost case
- Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
- Complementarity and information in collective action
- Private provision of public goods and information diffusion in social groups
- Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
- Efficient Provision of a Discrete Public Good
- Externality and information asymmetry in the production of local public goods
- Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information
- On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information
- Private provision of public goods under price uncertainty: a comment
- Identification of incomplete information allocation-transfer games in monotone equilibrium
- Private provision of public goods under price uncertainty
- Private provision of discrete public goods
- Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game
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