Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects
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Publication:2384427
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.005zbMath1155.91322OpenAlexW3125983187MaRDI QIDQ2384427
Flavio M. Menezes, Kunal Sengupta, Murali Agastya
Publication date: 21 September 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4784828000000000551.pdf
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