Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
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Publication:697848
DOI10.1006/JETH.2001.2855zbMATH Open1023.91009OpenAlexW2040053265MaRDI QIDQ697848FDOQ697848
Authors: M. C. Fu 
Publication date: 17 September 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1301.pdf
Recommendations
Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Cites Work
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models
- Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
- Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
- A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information
- Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
Cited In (35)
- Should the talk be cheap in contribution games?
- Maximal miscommunication
- Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
- Communication in Cournot oligopoly
- Long Cheap Talk
- Language and coordination games
- Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Comparative cheap talk
- Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
- Cheap play with no regret
- Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
- Communication and bargaining in the spatial model
- Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals
- Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information
- Hierarchical cheap talk
- Why we speak
- The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games
- Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information
- A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space
- Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games
- Valuable cheap talk and equilibrium selection
- Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations
- Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions
- Coordination via delay: theory and experiment
- An Exploration of Type Indeterminacy in Strategic Decision-Making
- Persuading large investors
- Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games
- Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach
- Communication and coordination with constraints
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- Coordination in games with incomplete information: experimental results
- A note on pre-play communication
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