Persuading large investors

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105933MaRDI QIDQ6664598FDOQ6664598

Authors: Ricardo Alonso, Konstantinos E. Zachariadis 

Publication date: 16 January 2025

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasioninformation designstress testsendogenous public signalfinancial disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91Bxx)

Cites Work

• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Endogenous public information and welfare in market games
• Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders
• Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Private Bayesian persuasion
• Stress tests and information disclosure
• Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
• The interval structure of optimal disclosure
• On the value of persuasion by experts
• Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
• Recommender systems as mechanisms for social learning
• The social value of information with an endogenous public signal
• Global manipulation by local obfuscation

Cited In (1)

• Stress test precision and bank competition

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