Persuading large investors

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105933MaRDI QIDQ6664598zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ricardo Alonso, Konstantinos E. Zachariadis

Publication date 16 January 2025

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasioninformation designstress testsendogenous public signalfinancial disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91Bxx)

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Cites work

• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
• Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders
• Endogenous public information and welfare in market games
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Global manipulation by local obfuscation
• Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
• Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
• On the value of persuasion by experts
• Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Private Bayesian persuasion
• Recommender systems as mechanisms for social learning
• Stress tests and information disclosure
• The interval structure of optimal disclosure
• The social value of information with an endogenous public signal

Cited in

(1)

• Stress test precision and bank competition

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