Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent

DOI10.3982/TE2834zbMath1419.91203OpenAlexW2898209809WikidataQ129049465 ScholiaQ129049465MaRDI QIDQ4612466

Arjada Bardhi, Yingni Guo

Publication date: 31 January 2019

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2834

zbMATH Keywords

collective decision-makingunanimity ruleinformation designinformation guard

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (10)

A Manipulation Game Based on Machiavellian Strategies ⋮ The perils of friendly oversight ⋮ Private Bayesian persuasion ⋮ Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations ⋮ Global manipulation by local obfuscation ⋮ Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers ⋮ Pivotal persuasion ⋮ Voting with public information ⋮ Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying ⋮ Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee

Cites Work

• Expert advice to a voting body
• Information and volatility
• Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Information acquisition in committees
• Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations
• Strategic Information Transmission
• An inequality for the weights of two families of sets, their unions and intersections
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Algorithmic Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion.
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Deliberation and Voting Rules

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