Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
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Publication:4612466
DOI10.3982/TE2834zbMATH Open1419.91203OpenAlexW2898209809WikidataQ129049465 ScholiaQ129049465MaRDI QIDQ4612466FDOQ4612466
Authors: Arjada Bardhi, Yingni Guo
Publication date: 31 January 2019
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2834
Recommendations
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- A unifying model to measure consensus solutions in a society
- Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions
- An Axiomatic Model of Persuasion
- Opinion consensus under external influences
Cites Work
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
- Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
- Information acquisition in committees
- An inequality for the weights of two families of sets, their unions and intersections
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
- Information and volatility
- Deliberation and Voting Rules
- On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
- Algorithmic aspects of private Bayesian persuasion
- Expert advice to a voting body
- Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations
Cited In (13)
- Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee
- Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying
- Private Bayesian persuasion
- Contagion management through information disclosure
- Pivotal persuasion
- Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers
- Global manipulation by local obfuscation
- Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
- Voting with public information
- A manipulation game based on Machiavellian strategies
- The perils of friendly oversight
- Persuading large investors
- Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests
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