Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent

DOI10.3982/TE2834MaRDI QIDQ4612466zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Arjada Bardhi, Yingni Guo

Publication date 31 January 2019

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te2834

zbMATH Keywords

unanimity rulecollective decision-makinginformation designinformation guard

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
• Pathways of persuasion
• Lifting majority to unanimity in opinion diffusion
• Satisfaction and power in unanimous majority influence decision models
• Multi-party persuasion: a paraconsistent approach
• A unifying model to measure consensus solutions in a society
• Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions
• An Axiomatic Model of Persuasion
• Opinion consensus under external influences

Cites work

• Algorithmic aspects of private Bayesian persuasion
• An inequality for the weights of two families of sets, their unions and intersections
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Deliberation and Voting Rules
• Expert advice to a voting body
• Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations
• Information acquisition in committees
• Information and volatility
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information

Cited in

(14)

• Global manipulation by local obfuscation
• Pivotal persuasion
• Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers
• A manipulation game based on Machiavellian strategies
• Voting with public information
• Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee
• Contagion management through information disclosure
• Voting to persuade
• The perils of friendly oversight
• Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
• Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying
• Private Bayesian persuasion
• Persuading large investors
• Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests

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