Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.006zbMath1282.91138OpenAlexW2084295445MaRDI QIDQ2437825

Ina Taneva, Laurent Mathevet

Publication date: 13 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/files/17895041/Taneva_Finite_supermodular_design.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

learningimplementationmechanismssupermodular gamesstrategic complementaritiesmultiple equilibrium problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Social choice (91B14)

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