Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2437825
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.006zbMath1282.91138MaRDI QIDQ2437825
Publication date: 13 March 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/files/17895041/Taneva_Finite_supermodular_design.pdf
learning; implementation; mechanisms; supermodular games; strategic complementarities; multiple equilibrium problem
91A10: Noncooperative games
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B44: Economics of information
91B14: Social choice
Related Items
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Rationalizable implementation
- Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
- The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
- Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
- Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
- A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations
- Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities
- Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
- Abreu-Matsushima mechanisms: Experimental evidence
- Supermodular mechanism design
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- The Limits of ex post Implementation
- Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Solution of Sparse Indefinite Systems of Linear Equations
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and the Correspondence Principle
- An Efficient Auction
