Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.002zbMath1132.91431OpenAlexW2264706445MaRDI QIDQ2496784

Paul J. Healy

Publication date: 20 July 2006

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-161011632

zbMATH Keywords

dynamicsexperimentspublic goodsmechanism designbest response

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (14)

The pivotal mechanism versus the voluntary contribution mechanism: an experimental comparison ⋮ Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade ⋮ The conditional contribution mechanism for repeated public goods -- the general case ⋮ Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions ⋮ Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences ⋮ Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms ⋮ A note on the stability of Chen's Lindahl mechanism ⋮ The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally ⋮ Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations ⋮ Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: experimental evidence ⋮ A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods ⋮ Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design ⋮ Generalized Groves-Ledyard mechanisms ⋮ Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents

Uses Software

• bootstrap

Cites Work

• Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
• Stable implementation of Lindahl allocations
• Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
• Implementation of Lindahl equilibrium: An integration of the static and dynamic approaches
• Axiomatic characterization of the quadratic scoring rule
• The set of Nash equilibria of a supermodular game is a complete lattice
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Stability and Speed of Adjustment under Retiming of Lags
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Incentives in Teams
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games
• A Pseudo-Metric Space of Probability Measures and the Existence of Measurable Utility
• The Matrix Multiplier and Distributed Lags
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms