Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms
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Publication:427552
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3215724 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
- A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations
- A note on the stability of Chen's Lindahl mechanism
- A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
- Adaptive expectations and dynamic adjustment in noncooperative games with incomplete information
- Implementation of Lindahl equilibrium: An integration of the static and dynamic approaches
- Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
- Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: experimental evidence
- Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Stable implementation of Lindahl allocations
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