Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms

DOI10.1007/S10058-011-0112-4zbMATH Open1239.91071OpenAlexW2089326555MaRDI QIDQ427552FDOQ427552

Matt Van Essen

Publication date: 13 June 2012

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-011-0112-4

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zbMATH Keywords

experimental economicsmechanism designLindahl allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Adaptive expectations and dynamic adjustment in noncooperative games with incomplete information
• A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations
• A note on the stability of Chen's Lindahl mechanism
• Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: experimental evidence
• A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
• Implementation of Lindahl equilibrium: An integration of the static and dynamic approaches
• Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
• Stable implementation of Lindahl allocations

Cited In (3)

• A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation
• Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
• A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods

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