A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.02.002zbMATH Open1393.91067OpenAlexW2290108234MaRDI QIDQ522997FDOQ522997

Yong-Cai Geng, Sumit K. Garg

Publication date: 20 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.002

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsallocation mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Strategic market games: an introduction.
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• Price-Quantity Strategic Market Games
• Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
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• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
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• Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: experimental evidence
• A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
• Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
• Stable implementation of Lindahl allocations
• Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
• Nash implementation of Lindahl allocations
• Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism
• Competitive Exchange

Cited In (5)

• Are We There Yet? Mechanism Design Beyond Equilibrium
• A simple(r) Lindahl solution to the provision of public goods with warm-glow: efficiency and implementation
• Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
• Efficient provision of public goods with endogenous redistribution
• Efficient mechanisms for a partially public good.

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