A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods
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Publication:522997
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.002zbMath1393.91067OpenAlexW2290108234MaRDI QIDQ522997
Publication date: 20 April 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.002
Public goods (91B18) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Cites Work
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