Markets for public decision-making

DOI10.1007/s00355-020-01298-4zbMath1471.91103arXiv1807.10836OpenAlexW3106331159MaRDI QIDQ2235098

Nikhil Garg, Benjamin Plaut, Ashish Goel

Publication date: 20 October 2021

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.10836

zbMATH Keywords

Fisher marketpairwise issue expansionpublic decision-making

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Computing Large Market Equilibria Using Abstractions

Cites Work

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