The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy
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Publication:1254933
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90001-1zbMath0399.90019MaRDI QIDQ1254933
Publication date: 1977
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90001-1
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Cites Work
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