The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90001-1MaRDI QIDQ1254933zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mamoru Kaneko

Publication date 1977

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90001-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Social choice (91B14) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites work

• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
• Existence of General Equilibrium in Multi-Regional Economies with Public Goods
• How to share the cost of a public good
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3390516 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3084669 (Why is no real title available?)
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a nonempty core of a majority game
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity in voting theory
• On Cores in Economies with Public Goods
• Social choice and individual values
• Stability in Voting
• The Core of a Public Goods Economy
• The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences

Cited in

(22)

• Existence, uniqueness and some comparative statics for ratio and Lindahl equilibria
• Cost share equilibria: a Lindahlian approach
• Optimal provision of public goods through Nash equilibria
• The equivalence of core and cost share equilibria in an economy with a public good
• A note on cost-share equilibrium and owner-consumers
• Proportional income taxes and cores in a public goods economy
• On informational efficiency and incentive aspects of generalized ratio equilibria
• Double implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations
• Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships
• Regular public good economies
• Algorithm for finding a proportional equilibrium
• Cooperative production: A comparison of lower and upper bounds
• Markets for public decision-making
• On the theory of cost sharing
• Constrained implementation
• A competitive equilibrium for a warm-glow economy
• The core coincides with the nucleolus allocations in a public goods economy with taxation
• Ratio equilibrium in an economy with externalities
• Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game
• Egalitarian equivalent capital allocation
• Local public good equilibrium
• The Walker-Groves-Ledyard mechanism: improving individual rationality without sacrificing simplicity or stability

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