The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
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Publication:3048534
DOI10.2307/2297045zbMath0413.90007OpenAlexW2153335615MaRDI QIDQ3048534
Peter J. Hammond, Partha Dasgupta, Eric S. Maskin
Publication date: 1979
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297045
surveysocial choiceincentive compatibilitydictatorialmisrepresentation of preferencesextensive bibliographysingleton social choice rules
Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming (90-02) Social choice (91B14)
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