On the robustness of strategy proof mechanisms
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Publication:1162431
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(82)90003-9zbMath0481.90007MaRDI QIDQ1162431
Roger Guesnerie, Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90003-9
dominant strategy; incentive compatible mechanisms; Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem; finite-dimensional parametrizations; implementation of social choice rules; robustness of strategy proof mechanisms
91B14: Social choice
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- Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
- Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies