A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
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Publication:3887166
DOI10.2307/1912821zbMath0443.90008OpenAlexW2071311305WikidataQ59885373 ScholiaQ59885373MaRDI QIDQ3887166
Jean-Jacques Laffont, Eric S. Maskin
Publication date: 1980
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ed457e7a243095f91065e4795ef1bcea69d6405a
public goodspartial differential equationsequivalent formulationdominant strategy mechanismsexistence of mechanismsintegrability of differential equations
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