The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences
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Publication:370961
DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0130-xzbMath1273.91152OpenAlexW1988524230MaRDI QIDQ370961
Publication date: 20 September 2013
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0130-x
Related Items (5)
The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences ⋮ Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms ⋮ Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers ⋮ Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness ⋮ Unanimous and Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Single-Peaked Preference Profiles on Graphs
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- Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
- Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
- A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes
- A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
- Convex Analysis
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