Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
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Publication:3048531
DOI10.2307/2297058zbMath0413.90003OpenAlexW2063392833MaRDI QIDQ3048531
Publication date: 1979
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/63952f92cfb4e8bcee69e24bcd6a45a31e2e00c4
probabilistic frameworkmajority and positional votingpoint voting schemessocial decision- making proceduressupporting size schemes
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