Probabilistic, fuzzy and rough concepts in social choice
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Publication:1278386
DOI10.1016/0377-2217(95)00295-2zbMath0943.90588OpenAlexW1994154418MaRDI QIDQ1278386
Hannu Nurmi, Mario Fedrizzi, Janusz Kacprzyk
Publication date: 22 February 1999
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(95)00295-2
rough setsfuzzy setsvotingsocial choicegroup decision makingspatial voting gameprobabilistic votingfuzzy majorityfuzzy preference
Decision theory (91B06) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Voting theory (91B12) Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)
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