A cardinal approach to straightforward probabilistic mechanisms

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90142-XzbMath0556.90002OpenAlexW2061599016MaRDI QIDQ761227

Xavier Freixas

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90142-x

zbMATH Keywords

expected utilitydominant strategycardinal utilitiesGibbard's theoremmanipulation of schemesprobabilistic mechanismstraightforwardnessvoting schemes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences ⋮ Truthful ownership transfer with expert advice ⋮ On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences ⋮ Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences ⋮ Collective choice under dichotomous preferences ⋮ Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach ⋮ Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers

Cites Work

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• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
• A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
• On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis