A cardinal approach to straightforward probabilistic mechanisms

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90142-XMaRDI QIDQ761227zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Xavier Freixas

Publication date 1984

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90142-x

zbMATH Keywords

cardinal utilitiesdominant strategyexpected utilityGibbard's theoremmanipulation of schemesprobabilistic mechanismstraightforwardnessvoting schemes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Social choice (91B14)

Review text

This paper extends Gibbard's theorem on the manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance, to the domain of cardinal utilities. Let there be a finite set of voters N (at least two), and a finite set of alternative S (at least three). Each player i has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility \(u_ i\) defined over S. A probabilistic mechanism is a map from the vector of reported utilities \((u'_ i)\) to the space of probability measures on S. Such a mechanism is straightforward if, for every player i, \(u_ i\) is a dominant strategy for expected utility maximization. The major result of the paper gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a probabilistic mechanism to be straightforward. The class of such mechanisms includes Gibbard's unilateral and duple mechanisms as special cases.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(11)

• Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
• Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
• Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
• Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
• The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences
• Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
• On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
• On guarantees, vetoes, and random dictators
• Truthful ownership transfer with expert advice
• Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
• Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes

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