Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.04.012MaRDI QIDQ2013352zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Semin Kim

Publication date 17 August 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.012

zbMATH Keywords

incentive compatibilityPareto efficiencyBayesian mechanism designordinal rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Optimal voting rules
• Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible probabilistic voting rules
• Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
• Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains

Cites work

• A cardinal approach to straightforward probabilistic mechanisms
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Efficient compromising
• Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules
• Interpersonal Comparability and Social Choice Theory
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On the justice of decision rules
• Optimal voting rules
• Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules
• Randomized preference aggregation: Additivity of power and strategy proofness
• Storable votes
• Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule

Cited in

(12)

• Optimal voting rules
• Truthful approximations to range voting
• A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility
• Voting with a Logarithmic Number of Cards
• On the implementation of the median
• Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
• Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible probabilistic voting rules
• Condorcet meets Bentham
• Random assignments and outside options
• Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
• Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules
• On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences

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