Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.04.012zbMATH Open1393.91056OpenAlexW2567912903MaRDI QIDQ2013352FDOQ2013352

Authors: Semin Kim 

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.012

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zbMATH Keywords

incentive compatibilityPareto efficiencyBayesian mechanism designordinal rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Interpersonal Comparability and Social Choice Theory
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
• Efficient compromising
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules
• Storable votes
• PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES
• On the justice of decision rules
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
• A cardinal approach to straightforward probabilistic mechanisms
• Randomized preference aggregation: Additivity of power and strategy proofness
• The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
• Optimal Voting Rules
• Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules

Cited In (8)

• PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES
• A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility
• Voting with a Logarithmic Number of Cards
• On the implementation of the median
• Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
• Condorcet meets Bentham
• Random assignments and outside options
• Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms

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