Randomized preference aggregation: Additivity of power and strategy proofness

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(80)90060-5zbMath0437.90008OpenAlexW2073983401MaRDI QIDQ1141566

Andrew McLennan

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(80)90060-5

zbMATH Keywords

votingprobability measureArrow's impossibility theoremstrategy proofnessadditivity of powerallocation of powerbinary social welfare schemedecision schemesdecision superschememixed social welfare functionsParetian social welfare schemerandomized preference aggregationstrict social welfare scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

On the structure of fuzzy social welfare functions, Fuzzy preferences and social choice, Random aggregation without the Pareto principle, Generalized Rawlsianism, Coalitional power structure without the Pareto principle, The representative agent model of probabilistic social choice, Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach, An axiomatic theory of political representation, Sophisticated preference aggregation, Distribution of coalitional power under probabilistic voting procedures, Social Choice Theory

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance