Randomized preference aggregation: Additivity of power and strategy proofness

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(80)90060-5zbMath0437.90008MaRDI QIDQ1141566

Andrew McLennan

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(80)90060-5

zbMATH Keywords

voting; probability measure; Arrow's impossibility theorem; strategy proofness; additivity of power; allocation of power; binary social welfare scheme; decision schemes; decision superscheme; mixed social welfare functions; Paretian social welfare scheme; randomized preference aggregation; strict social welfare scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Random aggregation without the Pareto principle, Sophisticated preference aggregation, An axiomatic theory of political representation, On the structure of fuzzy social welfare functions, Fuzzy preferences and social choice, Coalitional power structure without the Pareto principle, The representative agent model of probabilistic social choice, Distribution of coalitional power under probabilistic voting procedures

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance