Random aggregation without the Pareto principle

DOI10.1007/s10058-011-0111-5zbMath1242.91053OpenAlexW2082957400MaRDI QIDQ427548

Jérémy Picot

Publication date: 13 June 2012

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-011-0111-5

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto principlecoalitional power functionnon-impositionrandom aggregation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Individual preferences (91B08)

Cites Work

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• Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

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