Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
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Publication:2485952
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.005zbMath1112.91048OpenAlexW2093606268MaRDI QIDQ2485952
Anna Bogomolnaia, Richard A. Stong, Hervé Moulin
Publication date: 5 August 2005
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.005
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Cites Work
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- Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
