Approximating Nash social welfare under binary XOS and binary subadditive valuations

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_21OpenAlexW4225771455MaRDI QIDQ2152132FDOQ2152132

Authors: Siddharth Barman, Paritosh Verma 

Publication date: 6 July 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.02656

Recommendations

• Improving Nash social welfare approximations of indivisible goods
• Fair Division of Indivisible Goods for a Class of Concave Valuations
• On maximum weighted Nash welfare for binary valuations
• Approximating the Nash social welfare with budget-additive valuations
• Fair division with binary valuations: one rule to rule them all

zbMATH Keywords

Nash social welfarebinary marginalsdiscrete fair division

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

Cites Work

• Algorithmic Game Theory
• The bargaining problem
• Combinatorial optimization. Polyhedra and efficiency (3 volumes)
• Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
• Inapproximability results for bounded variants of optimization problems.
• Approximating the Nash social welfare with indivisible items
• Maximizing Nash product social welfare in allocating indivisible goods
• Nash social welfare for indivisible items under separable, piecewise-linear concave utilities
• On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive
• Efficiency and envy-freeness in fair division of indivisible goods: logical representation and complexity
• Pairwise kidney exchange
• Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
• An improved approximation algorithm for maximin shares
• Earning limits in Fisher markets with spending-constraint utilities
• Fair enough: guaranteeing approximate maximin shares
• Fair allocation of indivisible goods: improvement
• APX-hardness of maximizing Nash social welfare with indivisible items
• Nash social welfare, matrix permanent, and stable polynomials
• Fair division with binary valuations: one rule to rule them all
• Finding fair and efficient allocations when valuations don't add up
• Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences
• The fair division of hereditary set systems
• Approximating the Nash social welfare with budget-additive valuations
• Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Submodular Valuations through (Un)Matchings
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Approximating Nash social welfare under rado valuations

Cited In (6)

• Improved maximin guarantees for subadditive and fractionally subadditive fair allocation problem
• Nash welfare guarantees for fair and efficient coverage
• Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Submodular Valuations through (Un)Matchings
• Weighted fair division with matroid-rank valuations: monotonicity and strategyproofness
• Fair division with binary valuations: one rule to rule them all
• A fair and truthful mechanism with limited subsidy

This page was built for publication: Approximating Nash social welfare under binary XOS and binary subadditive valuations

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2152132)