Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders
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Publication:3169079
DOI10.1287/moor.1090.0436zbMath1216.68338OpenAlexW2104334470MaRDI QIDQ3169079
Noam Nisan, Shahar Dobzinski, Michael Schapira
Publication date: 27 April 2011
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1090.0436
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25)
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