Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders

Cited In (32)

Title not available (Why is that?)
Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing
Improved maximin guarantees for subadditive and fractionally subadditive fair allocation problem
Title not available (Why is that?)
Title not available (Why is that?)
Oblivious Medians Via Online Bidding
Envy-Free Revenue Approximation for Asymmetric Buyers with Budgets
On the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism for divisible resources
Title not available (Why is that?)
Expected time complexity of the auction algorithm and the push relabel algorithm for maximum bipartite matching on random graphs
On envy-free revenue approximation for combinatorial buyers with budgets
Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis
An Efficient Winner Approximation for a Series of Combinatorial Auctions
On bidding algorithms for a distributed combinatorial auction
On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources
Approximating Nash social welfare under binary XOS and binary subadditive valuations
Learning in auctions: regret is hard, envy is easy
Approximation algorithms for a winner determination problem of single-item multi-unit auctions
Fractionally Subadditive Maximization under an Incremental Knapsack Constraint with Applications to Incremental Flows
Prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids
Welfare maximization with friends-of-friends network externalities
Approximating Nash social welfare by matching and local search
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
Approximation Algorithms for k-Duplicates Combinatorial Auctions with Subadditive Bidders
Communication complexity of discrete fair division
Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
Two-stage submodular maximization under knapsack and matroid constraints
Online Submodular Welfare Maximization: Greedy Beats 1/2 in Random Order
Separating the Communication Complexity of Truthful and Nontruthful Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
A survey of approximability and inapproximability results for social welfare optimization in multiagent resource allocation

This page was built for publication: Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3169079)