Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_3zbMath1406.91122arXiv1508.06781OpenAlexW1901321320MaRDI QIDQ3460775

Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar

Publication date: 8 January 2016

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.06781

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative game theorysocial welfaresubadditive valuations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

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• On Maximizing Welfare When Utility Functions Are Subadditive
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• Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient

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