On Maximizing Welfare When Utility Functions Are Subadditive
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Publication:5189541
DOI10.1137/070680977zbMath1185.68855OpenAlexW1991223607MaRDI QIDQ5189541
Publication date: 17 March 2010
Published in: SIAM Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/070680977
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