Item bidding for combinatorial public projects

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2017.04.001zbMath1371.91071OpenAlexW2607052914MaRDI QIDQ526903

Evangelos Markakis, Orestis A. Telelis

Publication date: 15 May 2017

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2017.04.001

zbMATH Keywords

mechanismprice of anarchystrong equilibriumBayes-Nash equilibriumcombinatorial public project problemvaluation function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Item Pricing for Combinatorial Public Projects

Cites Work

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• Uniform price auctions: equilibria and efficiency
• Strong price of anarchy
• Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
• Item Pricing for Combinatorial Public Projects
• Inefficiency of Standard Multi-unit Auctions
• Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects
• Strong Price of Anarchy, Utility Games and Coalitional Dynamics
• Optimal Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions and Combinatorial Public Projects via Convex Rounding
• An analysis of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions—I
• On Maximizing Welfare When Utility Functions Are Subadditive
• Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
• Composable and efficient mechanisms
• Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions
• Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions

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