Inefficiency of Standard Multi-unit Auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-40450-4_33zbMath1395.91244arXiv1303.1646OpenAlexW2168566516MaRDI QIDQ2849330

Bart de Keijzer, Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer, Orestis A. Telelis

Publication date: 17 September 2013

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1303.1646

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (11)

Cost-Sharing Models in Participatory Sensing ⋮ On the Efficiency of All-Pay Mechanisms ⋮ Towards a characterization of worst case equilibria in the discriminatory price auction ⋮ Learning in auctions: regret is hard, envy is easy ⋮ Welfare guarantees for proportional allocations ⋮ On the efficiency of all-pay mechanisms ⋮ Item bidding for combinatorial public projects ⋮ Tight welfare guarantees for pure Nash equilibria of the uniform price auction ⋮ Equilibria of Greedy Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Item Pricing for Combinatorial Public Projects ⋮ Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax and Round

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