Towards a characterization of worst case equilibria in the discriminatory price auction

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_11OpenAlexW4205287734MaRDI QIDQ2152113FDOQ2152113

Artem Tsikiridis, Evangelos Markakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa

Publication date: 6 July 2022

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_11

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

Cites Work

• Composable and efficient mechanisms
• Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
• Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
• Inefficiency of Standard Multi-unit Auctions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions
• Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder
• Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Tight welfare guarantees for pure Nash equilibria of the uniform price auction

Cited In (2)

• The expected stop-out price in a discriminating auction
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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