Towards a characterization of worst case equilibria in the discriminatory price auction

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_11MaRDI QIDQ2152113zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Evangelos Markakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Artem Tsikiridis

Publication date 6 July 2022

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_11

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

Recommendations

• Inefficiency of standard multi-unit auctions
• Tight welfare guarantees for pure Nash equilibria of the uniform price auction
• Uniform price auctions: equilibria and efficiency
• Uniform price auctions: equilibria and efficiency
• On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7650363 (Why is no real title available?)
• Bayesian combinatorial auctions
• Composable and efficient mechanisms
• Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions
• Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
• Inefficiency of standard multi-unit auctions
• Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder
• Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient
• Tight welfare guarantees for pure Nash equilibria of the uniform price auction
• Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding

Cited in

(2)

• The expected stop-out price in a discriminating auction
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5602998 (Why is no real title available?)

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