Towards a characterization of worst case equilibria in the discriminatory price auction

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_11OpenAlexW4205287734MaRDI QIDQ2152113FDOQ2152113

Authors: Evangelos Markakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Artem Tsikiridis 

Publication date: 6 July 2022

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_11

Recommendations

• Inefficiency of standard multi-unit auctions
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• On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

Cites Work

• Composable and efficient mechanisms
• Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
• Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions
• Inefficiency of standard multi-unit auctions
• Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding
• Bayesian combinatorial auctions
• Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder
• Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Tight welfare guarantees for pure Nash equilibria of the uniform price auction

Cited In (2)

• The expected stop-out price in a discriminating auction
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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