Towards a characterization of worst case equilibria in the discriminatory price auction
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Publication:2152113
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_11OpenAlexW4205287734MaRDI QIDQ2152113
Artem Tsikiridis, Evangelos Markakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa
Publication date: 6 July 2022
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_11
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)
Cites Work
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