On the Efficiency of All-Pay Mechanisms

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48350-3_30zbMath1466.91128arXiv1508.01130OpenAlexW4230068923MaRDI QIDQ3452799

Bo Tang, George Christodoulou, Alkmini Sgouritsa

Publication date: 19 November 2015

Published in: Algorithms - ESA 2015 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.01130

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Auctions of heterogeneous objects
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Inefficiency of Standard Multi-unit Auctions
• Welfare Guarantees for Proportional Allocations
• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
• All-Pay Contests
• Uniform Price Auctions: Equilibria and Efficiency
• An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
• Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy
• Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
• Composable and efficient mechanisms
• Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
• Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions

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