Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game

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Publication:5704182

DOI10.1287/moor.1040.0091zbMath1082.90015OpenAlexW2167217653MaRDI QIDQ5704182

Ramesh Johari, John N. Tsitsiklis

Publication date: 11 November 2005

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1040.0091



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