Congestion games with complementarities
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Publication:5283369
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19zbMATH Open1489.91012arXiv1701.07304OpenAlexW2584358671MaRDI QIDQ5283369FDOQ5283369
Lennart Leder, Alexander Skopalik, Matthias Feldotto
Publication date: 21 July 2017
Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We study a model of selfish resource allocation that seeks to incorporate dependencies among resources as they exist in modern networked environments. Our model is inspired by utility functions with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) which is a well-studied model in economics. We consider congestion games with different aggregation functions. In particular, we study norms and analyze the existence and complexity of (approximate) pure Nash equilibria. Additionally, we give an almost tight characterization based on monotonicity properties to describe the set of aggregation functions that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1701.07304
Recommendations
aggregationcomplementaritiescongestion gamesexistence of equilibria\(L_p\) normsapproximate pure Nash equilibria
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Cited In (7)
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- Congestion Games with Multi-Dimensional Demands
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