Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2958352
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47zbMATH Open1486.91006arXiv1607.05143OpenAlexW3102005285MaRDI QIDQ2958352FDOQ2958352
Authors: Matthias Feldotto, Lennart Leder, Alexander Skopalik
Publication date: 1 February 2017
Published in: Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games and its bottleneck variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to model network scenarios in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike. We characterize the existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE) and the convergence of improvement dynamics. For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the approximation ratio of approximate pure Nash equilibria.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.05143
Recommendations
- Congestion games with mixed objectives
- Congestion games revisited
- Congestion games with complementarities
- Congestion Games with Multi-Dimensional Demands
- Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
- Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2004
- Congestion games with variable demands
- Congestion Games with Player-Specific Constants
- Congestion games with player-specific costs revisited
- Congestion games with higher demand dimensions
convergencecomplexityapproximationexistencecongestion gamesbottleneck congestion gamespure Nash equilibrium
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- Potential games
- Selfish unsplittable flows
- Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
- On the impact of combinatorial structure on congestion games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Convergence to approximate Nash equilibria in congestion games
- Pure Nash equilibria in player-specific and weighted congestion games
- Computing pure Nash and strong equilibria in bottleneck congestion games
- Efficient computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion games
- Congestion Games with Player-Specific Constants
- On the complexity of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in congestion and local-effect games
- Complexity of pure Nash equilibria in player-specific network congestion games
- Bounding the potential function in congestion games and approximate pure Nash equilibria
- Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games
- Bottleneck links, variable demand, and the tragedy of the commons
Cited In (10)
- Malicious Bayesian Congestion Games
- Uniform Mixed Equilibria in Network Congestion Games with Link Failures
- Transfer implementation in congestion games
- Congestion games with mixed objectives
- Congestion games with malicious players
- Congestion games with complementarities
- Congestion Games with Multi-Dimensional Demands
- Congestion games revisited
- Uniform mixed equilibria in network congestion games with link failures
- Computing equilibrium in network utility-sharing and discrete election games
This page was built for publication: Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2958352)