Malicious Bayesian Congestion Games
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Publication:3602834
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Cites work
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- A simplified NP-complete satisfiability problem
- Algorithms and Computation
- Approximation and Online Algorithms
- Atomic resource sharing in noncooperative networks
- Congestion games with malicious players
- Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
- Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- How bad is selfish routing?
- New complexity results about Nash equilibria
- Non-cooperative games
- On the impact of combinatorial structure on congestion games
- Selfish routing with incomplete information
- The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
- The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
- The price of routing unsplittable flow
- When selfish meets evil, Byzantine players in a virus inoculation game
- Worst-case equilibria
Cited in
(11)- Equilibria for networks with malicious users
- Verifiable crowd computing: coping with bounded rationality
- Algorithms and Computation
- The Price of Malice: A Game-Theoretic Framework for Malicious Behavior in Distributed Systems
- Pure Nash equilibria in a generalization of congestion games allowing resource failures
- Internalization of social cost in congestion games
- Congestion games with malicious players
- Pure Nash equilibria in a generalization of congestion games allowing resource failures
- Social learning in nonatomic routing games
- When selfish meets evil, Byzantine players in a virus inoculation game
- Verifiable crowd computing: coping with bounded rationality
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