Malicious Bayesian Congestion Games

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-93980-1_10zbMATH Open1209.91045OpenAlexW1670930141MaRDI QIDQ3602834FDOQ3602834

Authors: Martin Gairing 

Publication date: 12 February 2009

Published in: Approximation and Online Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-93980-1_10

Recommendations

• Congestion games with malicious players
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• ``Beat-your-rival routing games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Games involving graphs (91A43) Distributed systems (68M14)

Cites Work

• Non-cooperative games
• Worst-case equilibria
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• How bad is selfish routing?
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• A simplified NP-complete satisfiability problem
• New complexity results about Nash equilibria
• Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
• On the impact of combinatorial structure on congestion games
• The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
• The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
• Approximation and Online Algorithms
• Atomic resource sharing in noncooperative networks
• The price of routing unsplittable flow
• Congestion games with malicious players
• Selfish routing with incomplete information
• When selfish meets evil, Byzantine players in a virus inoculation game
• Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games
• Algorithms and Computation

Cited In (11)

• Equilibria for networks with malicious users
• Verifiable crowd computing: coping with bounded rationality
• Algorithms and Computation
• The Price of Malice: A Game-Theoretic Framework for Malicious Behavior in Distributed Systems
• Pure Nash equilibria in a generalization of congestion games allowing resource failures
• Pure Nash equilibria in a generalization of congestion games allowing resource failures
• Internalization of social cost in congestion games
• Congestion games with malicious players
• When selfish meets evil, Byzantine players in a virus inoculation game
• Social learning in nonatomic routing games
• Verifiable crowd computing: coping with bounded rationality

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