Selfish routing with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/S00224-007-9015-8MaRDI QIDQ2471698zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Martin Gairing, Burkhard Monien, Karsten Tiemann

Publication date 18 February 2008

Published in Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-007-9015-8

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian Nash equilibriaCoordination ratioIncomplete informationSelfish routing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10) Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cited in

(25)

• Two-terminal routing games with unknown active players
• Social learning in nonatomic routing games
• Evolutionary equilibrium in Bayesian routing games: specialization and niche formation
• Efficiency analysis of load balancing games with and without activation costs
• Using reputation instead of tolls in repeated selfish routing with incomplete information
• Strong equilibria in the vehicle routing game
• Evolutionary Equilibrium in Bayesian Routing Games: Specialization and Niche Formation
• Routing problem with splitable traffic and incomplete information
• Malicious Bayesian Congestion Games
• Social context congestion games
• Strong coalitional structure in an open vehicle routing game
• Routing selfish unsplittable traffic
• Value of information in Bayesian routing games
• The Value of Information in Selfish Routing
• Common-knowledge and Bayesian equilibrium in network game
• Bayesian ignorance
• Facets of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture
• A note on social learning in non-atomic routing games
• Graphical congestion games
• The contest game for crowdsourcing reviews
• Which is the worst-case Nash equilibrium?
• The impact of social ignorance on weighted congestion games
• Bayesian ignorance
• Nash equilibria in discrete routing games with convex latency functions
• Facets of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium conjecture

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